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Being Chinese in Australia: Public opinion in Chinese communities

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BEING CHINESE IN AUSTRALIA: PUBLIC OPINION IN CHINESE COMMUNITIES

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- produce distinctive research and fresh policy options for Australia's international policy and to contribute to the wider international debate
- promote discussion of Australia's role in the world by providing an accessible and high-quality forum for discussion of Australian international relations through debates, seminars, lectures, dialogues and conferences.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

More than 1.2 million people of Chinese heritage live in Australia today. Their experiences are as diverse as their views: many were born in Australia, with lineages that span generations of Australian history. Others have migrated in recent years from China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Southeast Asia. According to the Lowy Institute's first Chinese-Australian poll, most Chinese-Australians feel a sense of belonging, acceptance and pride living in Australia. However, a significant minority of Chinese-Australians have experienced discrimination of some kind in the past year. Many say the COVID-19 pandemic and the state of Australia-China relations contributed to that experience.

Most Chinese-Australians also feel a sense of belonging to China, and that affects how they view that country, according to the survey results. Levels of trust in China are much higher in Chinese-Australian communities than in the broader Australian population. Chinese-Australians are more likely than other Australians to see China as an economic partner rather than as a security threat to Australia. They are divided in their views on China's authoritarian system of government in light of COVID-19, and only a third say democracy is preferable to any other kind of government. In comparison, 71% of the broader Australian population express a preference for democracy. But Chinese-Australians' perspectives on systems of government do not extend to all aspects of the Chinese system: many are critical of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). For example, the majority of Chinese-Australians support sanctions on Chinese officials associated with human rights abuses, and want Australia to reduce its economic dependence on China.

After four years of debate about the extent and nature of Chinese influence in Australian society, Chinese-Australians hold mixed views about foreign interference in Australia. Fewer Chinese-Australians express concern about foreign interference in Australia's political process than the broader Australian population, and most say they do not have regular or substantive contact with Chinese diplomats or overseas Chinese organisations. The vast majority of Chinese-Australians follow news and politics in both Australia and China, and use the Chinese social media app WeChat for news. While many Chinese-Australians say that Australian media coverage of China is too negative, a significant proportion (more than that in the broader Australian population) say it is too positive.

Being Chinese in Australia: Public Opinion in Chinese Communities reports the results of a national survey conducted between 10 and 30 November 2020 of 1040 Australian residents who self-identify as of Chinese heritage. The margin of error is approximately 1.96. The survey was conducted in English and Mandarin by the Social Research Centre and the Multicultural Research Panel. A nationally representative survey of 3029 Australian adults was also conducted in parallel by the Social Research Centre from 9 to 23 November 2020. See page 56 for more information.

INTRODUCTION

The Australian communities of Chinese heritage today number 1.2 million people. There is significant diversity in the community: many were born in Australia, with family histories that span generations of Australia's past. The majority have migrated more recently, moving from China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Southeast Asia. Since the first Chinese migrants landed in Australia in the 1800s, Chinese-Australian communities have flourished and contributed to many aspects of Australian life.¹ The past half-century has also seen other connections between Australia and China expand in many fields: economic, cultural and political.²

Since 2017, however, the bilateral relationship between China and Australia has deteriorated significantly. Over that period, links between Chinese-Australians and Beijing have come under scrutiny from the Australian government, media and the public. Media reports have aired evidence of donations to Australian political entities allegedly in service of the interests of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).³

The first Chinese-Australian was elected to the House of Representatives in 2019. Yet the election of Gladys Liu, Member for Chisholm in Victoria, soon turned to controversy, following disclosures about Ms Liu's memberships of Chinese associations linked to China's united front — a system of CCP networks responsible for influencing civil society and other groups in China and abroad.⁴

Adding to these strains, the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic placed further pressure on Australia-China relations. Reports from Chinese-Australian communities suggested racial tensions were heightened and Chinese-Australians were being subjected to rising discrimination and prejudice.⁵ Following Australia's call for an independent international investigation into the origins of COVID-19, China warned Chinese students and tourists of the risk of racist attacks if they travelled to Australia.⁶

Several Chinese-Australians were questioned in a federal parliamentary inquiry about their allegiance to Australia.⁷ Others have reported stepping back from public life.⁸

To understand the effect of these developments for Chinese-Australian communities more broadly, the Lowy Institute conducted a nationally representative poll of Chinese-Australians in November 2020,⁹ asking

them about their perspectives on life in Australia, and views on a wide range of issues — from foreign influence and relationships with China, to systems of government and pride in Australian life and culture.

To compare the views of Chinese-Australians with those of the broader Australian population, we also conducted a simultaneous national survey of 3000 Australian adults in November 2020. This dataset will form the basis for future surveys and further research from the Lowy Institute's Multiculturalism, Identity and Influence Project.



THE AUSTRALIAN WAY OF LIFE

LIVING IN AUSTRALIA

Despite the increasing political and social pressures outlined above, Chinese-Australians are largely positive about life and culture in Australia. The vast majority of Chinese-Australians say Australia is a good or very good place to live (77%). Even more Chinese-Australians (84%) feel either a great or moderate extent of pride in Australia's way of life and culture. This level of pride is very similar to that of the broader Australian population, reported as 88% in 2020 in the annual Scanlon Foundation survey.¹⁰ It accords with other evidence that Chinese-Australians share positive stories about their life in Australia via Chinese social media platforms.¹¹

While pride in the Australian way of life and culture is consistently high across different generations of Chinese-Australians, the longer they are in the country, the more positive they seem to become. Four in ten (44%) Chinese-Australians who arrived in Australia between 2000 and 2019 say they take pride in the Australian way of life and culture to a great extent, compared to 58% of those born in Australia or arriving prior to 2000.

When asked about their personal experiences, seven in ten Chinese-Australians (69%) say that they feel accepted in their day-to-day life as a part of Australian society. There is a stark divide between Chinese-Australian citizens, permanent residents and long-term visa holders on this question. Three-quarters of Chinese-Australian citizens and permanent residents (75%) say they personally feel accepted as a part of Australian society, compared with 52% of long-term visa holders.

On questions of identity and belonging, most Chinese-Australians express attachments to both Australia and China. More than half the respondents (55%) identify as either Chinese-Australian or Australian-Chinese. A further 9% say they identify as Australian. A third (34%) say they identify as Chinese. In focus groups conducted by the Lowy Institute to complement the survey, many respondents volunteered that they identified differently in different contexts. For example, some identified as Chinese-Australian while in Australia, but only as Australian when overseas.¹²

Chinese immigration has been a part of the Australian story since the 1800s.

We surveyed these communities to understand their perspectives on life in Australia.

KEY FINDING

77%

SAY AUSTRALIA IS A GOOD OR VERY GOOD PLACE TO LIVE

To understand Chinese-Australians' perspective on their place in the community, we asked about their feelings of acceptance, and where Chinese-Australians felt they belonged.

Seven in ten Chinese-Australians (71%) say they feel a great or moderate sense of belonging to Australia, and 69% to their local community. Many Chinese-Australians also identify with China, which is common in migrant communities connected by culture, language, history or religion.¹³ Significant proportions of Chinese-Australians express a sense of belonging to the Chinese people (68% saying 'to a great or moderate extent') and to China (65%). This was more pronounced among recent migrants (those migrating to Australia between 2010 and 2019), of whom 81% say they had a sense of belonging to China. By contrast, only a third of respondents born in Australia or who migrated prior to 2010 (35%) express a sense of belonging to China.


KEY FINDING

63%

**FEEL THAT
PEOPLE WITH
CHINESE
HERITAGE ARE
ACCEPTED IN
AUSTRALIAN
SOCIETY**

The vast majority of Chinese-Australians say Australia is a good or very good place to live.

Overall, how would you rate Australia as a place to live?




Very good Good Average Poor

Different generations of Chinese-Australians share pride in the Australian way of life and culture.

More time in Australia appears to add to positivity about Australian life and culture. Chinese-Australians who arrived before 2000 are more positive than those who arrived in the last two decades.

To what extent do you take pride in the Australian way of life and culture?



Data for the broader Australian population is from the [Scanlon Foundation 2020 Mapping Social Cohesion report](#).




**BELONGING
AND
COMMUNITY**

Most Chinese-Australians personally feel accepted in their day-to-day life as a part of Australian society.

There is a stark divide between Chinese-Australian citizens, permanent residents and long-term visa holders on this question, with citizens and permanent residents more likely to feel accepted than long-term visa holders.


In your day-to-day life, do you feel that you are generally accepted or not accepted as part of Australian society?



■ Yes, I feel I am generally accepted ■ Neither
■ No, I do not feel generally accepted

Similarly, most say that Australians of Chinese heritage are generally accepted as a part of Australian society.


Do you feel that Australians of Chinese heritage generally are, or are not accepted as part of Australian society?



- Yes, Australians of Chinese heritage generally are accepted
- No, they are not generally accepted as part of Australian society


While most identified as Chinese-Australian or Australian-Chinese, many considered themselves only Chinese or Australian.

Overall, do you think of yourself as...?



Seven in ten Chinese-Australians feel a sense of belonging to Australia, to a great or moderate extent.


To what extent do you have a sense of belonging in Australia?



Data for the broader Australian population is from the [Scanlon Foundation 2020 Mapping Social Cohesion report](#).

Most Chinese-Australians express attachment to both Australia and China.

To what extent do you have a sense of belonging to...?





2640
1517

COVID

19

**EXPERIENCES OF
DISCRIMINATION**

AD

DISCRIMINATION IN AUSTRALIA: PERCEIVED AND ACTUAL

After the initial COVID-19 outbreak came to light in early 2020, media outlets reported an increase in abuse and racism directed at Chinese-Australians.

KEY FINDING

18%

**HAVE BEEN
PHYSICALLY
THREATENED OR
ATTACKED
BECAUSE OF
THEIR CHINESE
HERITAGE**

After the initial COVID-19 outbreak became evident in early 2020, Chinese-Australians experienced mixed reactions in Australia.¹⁴ Four in ten Chinese-Australians (40%) say ‘someone expressed support for [them] because of [their] Chinese heritage’ in the past 12 months. However, only slightly fewer (37%) say they personally had been ‘treated differently or less favourably’ in the past 12 months because of their Chinese heritage. In the past year, three in ten respondents (31%) say they have been ‘called offensive names because of [their] Chinese heritage’. A sizeable minority of Chinese-Australians (18%) say they have been ‘physically threatened or attacked’ in the past 12 months because of their Chinese heritage. Two-thirds (66%) say COVID-19 contributed to or caused these reported experiences in the past year.

The changes in the bilateral relationship also appear to be a factor, with the majority of respondents (52%) saying that Australia–China relations had caused or contributed to their experience. When asked to volunteer other factors that may have contributed to these experiences of discrimination, 28% say racism played a role.

During the pandemic, Chinese-Australians appear to have experienced discrimination to a greater extent than would be expected based on their impressions of discrimination against Chinese-Australians more generally. Only a quarter of Chinese-Australians (26%) say they have the impression there is ‘a lot of discrimination against people of Chinese heritage’ in Australia today, compared to the 37% that report they have been treated differently in the past 12 months.

In our parallel national survey, 36% of Australians say they have the impression that there is ‘a lot of discrimination against people of Chinese heritage’. A generational gap was evident on this question: the majority of 18–29 year-old Australians (57%) say there is ‘a lot of discrimination’ against people of Chinese heritage — a view shared by only a quarter (25%) of Australians over 60.

While the length of time spent in Australia is one factor in Chinese-Australians’ sense of belonging (see Table 7, p.61), evidence from other studies suggests that discrimination can be an obstacle to the integration of Chinese migrants. For example, Chinese-Americans have reported that perceived discrimination has made their integration and life in America more difficult.¹⁵

Some Chinese-Australians experienced support from the broader Australian community in the past year, while others reported negative treatment, abuse and attacks.

For each of the following, please indicate if you have or have not personally experienced it in the last 12 months in Australia?

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Someone expressed support for you because you are of Chinese heritage



People have treated you differently or less favourably because you are of Chinese heritage



You have been called offensive names because you are of Chinese heritage



You have been physically threatened or attacked because you are of Chinese heritage




■ Yes, has happened to me in the last 12 months

■ No, has not happened to me in the last 12 months

The majority said the COVID-19 pandemic and the state of Australia-China relations had contributed to that experience.

Would you say the following factors did or did not cause or contribute to that experience?




■ Yes, did contribute ■ No, did not contribute ■ Don't know

This question was only asked of those that answered 'Yes' to the previous question; n=717.

Chinese-Australians underestimate the level of discrimination against people of Chinese heritage in Australia.

Just your impression, in Australia today, is there a lot of discrimination against Australians of Chinese heritage, or not?



■ Yes, there is a lot of discrimination ■ No, not a lot of discrimination
■ Don't know

Data for the broader Australian population was gathered during a parallel survey and fielded to a nationally representative sample of more than 3000 Australian adults in November 2020.

The image features a dark, textured background with several overlapping, tilted rectangular panels. Each panel contains a different film still. The top-left panel shows a person in a white shirt. The top-right panel shows a person in a white shirt. The middle-left panel shows a person in a white shirt. The middle-right panel shows a person in a white shirt. The bottom-left panel shows a person in a white shirt. The bottom-right panel shows a person in a white shirt. The text "FOREIGN INTERFERENCE" is overlaid in the center in a bold, white, sans-serif font.

**FOREIGN
INTERFERENCE**

FOREIGN INTERFERENCE

Over the past three years, the Australian government has put in place new legislative and security regimes in response to evidence of attempts by China to interfere in Australian political processes.¹⁶

Chinese-Australians are divided about China's influence on Australia's political processes. Just less than half (46%) are concerned about China's influence, while 54% are not concerned. There is a substantial gap between Chinese-Australians' perceptions of foreign influence from abroad and the views of the broader Australian population. In our parallel national survey, a much higher proportion of the broader Australian population (82%) express concern about China's influence in Australia's political processes, with 61% expressing concern about the influence of the United States.

More Chinese-Australians express concern about influence from Japan (55%) and India (54%) than from China. A third of Chinese-Australians (33% — far fewer than in the broader Australian population) say they are concerned about the influence of the United States on Australia's political processes.

Much of the debate on foreign interference in Australia has focused on the relationship between Chinese-Australians and the Chinese government, including through Chinese officials or representatives of the Chinese government and overseas Chinese associations.¹⁷ For example, media reports allege Chinese diplomats have arranged parades and protests on issues important to China, or have threatened dissidents in Australia.¹⁸

Few respondents report having regular contact with the Chinese embassy or consulate in their state or territory. Almost half (45%) say they had no contact with the Chinese embassy or consulate over the last 12 months. Only 2% say they have regular contact, and in focus group research, respondents have said that most contact with their local diplomatic mission has been related to visa processing for travel to China.¹⁹

Chinese-Australians report similarly limited interaction with Chinese community organisations. Political candidates in Australia have come under intense scrutiny for their connections with such community organisations, some of which have been linked to the CCP.²⁰ However, most Chinese-Australians interact infrequently or never with such

With the rise of debates about foreign interference in Australia, we asked Chinese-Australians about views on the influence of foreign countries, relative attention given to interference and interactions with Chinese officials and organisations.

KEY FINDING

46%

ARE CONCERNED ABOUT CHINA'S INFLUENCE ON AUSTRALIA'S POLITICAL PROCESSES

organisations. Almost half those surveyed (47%) interact with Chinese community and cultural organisations ‘every few months’ or ‘once a year’. More than a quarter (28%) say they have no interaction with these organisations at all. One quarter (25%) have regular interactions with Chinese organisations (‘once a week’ or ‘once a month’).


The media and government focus on foreign interference and the influence of the CCP has, according to some commentators, placed Chinese-Australians “under the spotlight”.²¹ At times, Chinese-Australians have publicly welcomed changes in Australian government policy, having experienced interference or coercion from China themselves.²² But some are concerned at media reporting that portrays Chinese-Australians as possible agents for the CCP, without providing evidence of wrongdoing.²³

These mixed reactions to the foreign interference debate are reflected in the views of the Chinese-Australian community. In the context of the focus placed by the federal government and media on the issue of foreign interference by China, Chinese-Australians are divided as to whether too much, too little or the right amount of attention has been given to foreign interference by the media, politicians and the public.

Nearly half of Chinese-Australians say too much attention has been given to foreign interference by the media (45%) and politicians (44%). Only a third (30%) say the public has placed too much attention on foreign interference issues. Conversely, 39% believe that the public has paid too little attention to foreign interference. Views are mixed across Chinese-Australian communities, and there are no clear correlations with the length of time spent in Australia or place of birth. However, more respondents that identify as Chinese or Chinese-Australian say too much attention has been paid to the issue of foreign interference than respondents that identify as Australian or Australian-Chinese.

Chinese-Australians are divided about China's influence on Australia's political processes...

Now about the issue of foreign influence in Australia's political processes. Are you personally concerned or not concerned about the influence of each of the following countries on Australia's political processes?




■ Yes, concerned ■ No, not concerned

Data for the broader Australian population was gathered during a parallel survey and fielded to a nationally representative sample of more than 3000 Australian adults in November 2020.


...and are similarly split as to the levels of attention that have been given to the issue of interference by the media, politicians and the public.

Do you personally think too much, too little or about the right amount of attention is given to the issue of foreign interference by each of the following groups?




Few respondents report having regular contact with the Chinese embassy or consulate in their state or territory.

Over the last 12 months, how often, if at all, have you had any contact with the Chinese embassy or consulate in your state or territory?



Most Chinese-Australians say they have limited interaction with overseas Chinese community organisations.

Over the last 12 months, how often, if at all, have you had any interaction with overseas Chinese community and cultural organisations?



At least once a week About once a month Every few months
Once or twice Never



SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY

FOREIGN POLICY, SECURITY, AND THREATS TO AUSTRALIA’S INTERESTS

We asked Chinese-Australians for their views on countries in our region, and how they ranked various potential threats to Australia’s interests.

KEY FINDING

66%

BELIEVE CHINA IS MORE OF AN ECONOMIC PARTNER THAN A SECURITY THREAT TO AUSTRALIA

The dual ties felt by Chinese-Australians — their sense of identity as both Chinese and Australian and of belonging to both countries — are also evident in their views on foreign policy issues. Three-quarters of Chinese-Australians (74%) say they trust Australia somewhat or a great deal to act responsibly in the world. A similarly high number (72%) also trust China to act responsibly in the world. Far more Chinese-Australians say they trust Australia and China than trust the United States (57%), Japan (54%) or India (41%).

The level of trust that Chinese-Australians place in China and Japan is noticeably different from that of the broader Australian population. The 2020 Lowy Institute Poll found only 23% of Australians trust China to act responsibly in the world. By contrast, eight in ten Australians (82%) expressed some or a great deal of trust in Japan. Chinese-Australians’ level of trust in the United States (57%) and in India (41%), however, is similar to that of the broader Australian population (51% and 45% respectively).

The majority of Chinese-Australians see China as a benign presence in the region, on a par with Japan, India and the United States. When asked whether each country is more of an economic partner or security threat to Australia, for two-thirds of respondents (66%), both China and Japan are more of an economic partner to Australia, while for 34% they are more of a security threat (although paradoxically, concerns about Japan’s political influence are higher than for China’s (p.66). In the same question in the 2020 Lowy Institute Poll, significantly fewer Australians (55%) said China was more of an economic partner, with 41% seeing it as more of a security threat.

Six in ten Chinese-Australians see both India (60%) and the United States (59%) more as economic partners to Australia than security threats (40% and 41% respectively).

The economy is more of a concern to Chinese-Australians than the issue of foreign interference in terms of what they see as threats to Australia’s vital interests. ‘COVID-19 and other potential epidemics’ is the top-ranked threat for Chinese-Australians, with 51% saying those issues pose a critical threat to Australia’s vital interests in the next ten

years. Next highest ranked is ‘a severe downturn in the global economy,’ with 41% seeing it as a critical threat. Yet far fewer Chinese-Australians view these threats as critical than among the broader Australian population, of which 76% rated COVID-19 a critical threat and 71% saw a downturn in the global economy as a critical threat in the 2020 Lowy Institute Poll.

A sizeable minority of Chinese-Australians (40%) regard ‘the dissemination of false information and fake news’ as a critical threat, ranking this the next highest of the nine threats posed in the survey.²⁴ Around a third of Chinese-Australians say ‘cyberattacks from foreign countries’ (36%) and ‘the rise of authoritarian systems of government around the world’ (34%) are critical threats.


Only three in ten Chinese-Australians (32%) view the prospect of ‘a military conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan’ as a critical threat, slightly fewer than in the broader Australian population (35%) in 2020. Just 32% of Chinese-Australians see ‘large numbers of immigrants and refugees coming into Australia’ as a critical threat (see p.51 for more on immigration).

Chinese-Australians rank ‘foreign interference in Australian politics’ at the bottom of the list of nine threats, with only 29% saying it poses a critical threat to Australia’s vital interests (see p.67). By contrast, 42% of the broader Australian population saw foreign interference as a critical threat in the 2020 Lowy Institute Poll.

Chinese-Australians appear to be significantly less concerned about the threat of climate change than the broader population. Three in ten Chinese-Australians (30%) say ‘climate change’ poses a critical threat to Australia’s vital interests over the next ten years, compared with 59% of the broader population as recorded in the 2020 Lowy Institute Poll. On this issue, Chinese-Australians align more closely with Coalition-leaning Australians, with 34% of this group in 2020 saying climate change poses a critical threat (compared with 75% of Labor-leaning Australians). The role of Chinese-language media for Chinese-Australian communities may be a factor here, with evidence that news reports on WeChat in Australia are “overwhelmingly politically conservative”.²⁵

Seven in ten Chinese-Australians trust both Australia and China to act responsibly in the world.

How much do you trust the following countries to act responsibly in the world?




■ A great deal
 ■ Somewhat
 ■ Not very much
 ■ Not at all

Data for the broader Australian population is from the [2020 Lowy Institute Poll](#).

The majority of Chinese-Australians see China as more of an economic partner to Australia.

In your own view, is the following country more of an economic partner to Australia or more of a security threat to Australia?




More of an economic partner to Australia
More of a security threat to Australia
Both equally
Don't know

Data for the broader Australian population is from the [2020 Lowy Institute Poll](#).

In general, Chinese-Australians are less concerned about potential threats to Australia than the broader Australian population.

Here is a list of possible threats to the vital interests of Australia in the next ten years. For each one, please select whether you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all.





■ Critical threat
 ■ An important but not critical threat
■ Not an important threat at all
 ■ Don't know

Data for the broader Australian population is from the [2019 and 2020 Lowy Institute Poll](#).

A nighttime photograph of the Parliament Building in Malaysia, illuminated against a dark, cloudy sky. The building's distinctive spire and flagpole are prominent. The foreground shows a well-lit road and landscaped greenery. The text 'SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT' is overlaid in large, white, bold letters across the lower half of the image.

SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT

PERCEPTIONS ON SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT

In the context of a worldwide debate about the role of political systems in responding to the COVID-19 crisis, we surveyed Chinese-Australians about their outlook on democracy and China’s system of government.

KEY FINDING

43%

ARE MORE FAVOURABLE ABOUT CHINA’S SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT AFTER COVID-19


The low levels of concern about foreign interference among Chinese-Australian communities might also reflect their views more broadly about political systems. A third of Chinese-Australians (36%) say ‘democracy is preferable to any other kind of government’, a far smaller proportion than the 71% of the broader Australian population expressing that view in the parallel survey. Four in ten Chinese-Australians (41%) say ‘in some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable’ and 22% say ‘for someone like me, it doesn’t matter what kind of government we have’. These findings align with academic research indicating that migrants leaving authoritarian regimes to settle in a stable democracy “do not see democracy as the only game in town”.²⁶

The disparate handling of the COVID-19 pandemic has also sparked a worldwide debate about the role of political systems in responding to crises. The relative success of China in managing COVID-19, compared with failures in the United States, has been held up as an example of the limitations of democracy — although the experiences of Australia, Taiwan and New Zealand in countering the pandemic provide evidence of the opposite.²⁷ However, this debate may have had an impact on Chinese-Australians’ views of China’s political system. When asked their views on China’s system of government in the context of its handling of the COVID-19 outbreak, 43% say they are more favourable towards it, while 31% say they are less favourable.

In their views of China’s system of government, there are notable differences between citizens and non-citizens of Australia, and between various waves of migration of Chinese-Australians. Only 38% of the Australian citizen respondents are more favourable towards China’s system of government, compared with 50% of permanent residents and long-term visa holders. A similar divide is present between more recent migrants and those born in or migrating to Australia before 2010: 48% of the more recent arrivals are more favourable towards China’s system of government in view of its handling of COVID-19 compared with 26% of those born in Australia or migrating before 2010 (26%).

Chinese-Australians are divided about their preferences between democratic and non-democratic systems of government.

Below are some statements about democracy. Please indicate which one of the three statements comes closest to your own personal views about democracy.




- Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government
- For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have
- In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable
- Don't know

Data for the broader Australian population was gathered during a parallel survey and fielded to a nationally representative sample of more than 3000 Australian adults in November 2020.

Chinese-Australians are more favourable than the broader Australian population towards China's system of government after the COVID-19 pandemic.

In this question, there were notable differences between citizens and permanent residents and visa holders, and between various waves of migration of Chinese-Australians.

Thinking about the way China has handled the COVID-19 outbreak, are you more or less favourable towards China's system of government?



Data for the broader Australian population is from [CovidPoll](#), reported with the 2020 Lowy Institute Poll.



AUSTRALIA'S CHINA POLICY

AUSTRALIA'S CHINA POLICY

Given the deterioration in the bilateral relationship between Australia and China, we asked Chinese-Australians questions about possible policy options for dealing with China.

KEY FINDING

67%

**WOULD SUPPORT
SANCTIONS ON
CHINESE
OFFICIALS
ASSOCIATED WITH
HUMAN RIGHTS
ABUSES**

The sentiments of Chinese-Australians about Australia's policies towards China appear to span a broad spectrum when examining their views across a range of issues including aid, trade, technology infrastructure, military cooperation, scientific research and human rights.

Seven in ten Chinese-Australians (70%) say Australia should jointly fund aid projects with China in the Pacific and Asia. However, a similarly high proportion of respondents (67%) say Australia should impose 'travel and financial sanctions on Chinese officials associated with human rights abuses', suggesting a significant level of support for addressing such abuses through targeted sanctions, as is currently under investigation by an Australian parliamentary inquiry.²⁸ There is also strong support for imposing sanctions of this nature in the broader Australian population, with 82% approving of this policy suggestion in the 2020 Lowy Institute Poll.

A sizeable majority of Chinese-Australians (65%) would support Australia finding other markets 'to reduce our economic dependence on China', a sentiment shared by almost all Australians (94% in the 2020 Lowy Institute Poll). However, Chinese-Australians appear to be at odds with the broader Australian population on whether to allow Chinese technology companies to participate in critical infrastructure projects — an issue that has become increasingly prominent with the Chinese government escalating its criticisms of Australia for excluding the Chinese telcos Huawei and ZTE from its 5G rollout.²⁹ While only 39% of the broader Australian population would support 'allowing Chinese companies to supply technology for critical infrastructure' projects, 65% of Chinese-Australians would allow Chinese technology in such infrastructure.³⁰


More than half the Chinese-Australian population (58%) support Australia 'conducting joint military exercises with China and other countries', a policy option that only 39% of the broader Australian population supported in 2020. Australian and Chinese army personnel have participated several times in the joint military exercise *Pandaroo* since 2015.³¹

On the question of joint scientific research in defence and security-related fields, Chinese-Australians are divided. In 2019, the Australian government established a University Foreign Interference Taskforce, in

part because of allegations that collaboration with Chinese universities could be leveraged by China's military and security agencies for surveillance or military purposes.³² Almost exactly half of Chinese-Australians (49%) support 'restricting joint scientific research between Australia and China in defence and security-related fields', with 51% opposing.

Chinese-Australians support aid cooperation with China, but express concern about human rights violations and Australia's economic reliance on China.

Would you support or oppose the following Australian government policies towards China?



Support Oppose Don't know

Data for the broader Australian population is from the [2020 Lowy Institute Poll](#).

Messages



WhatsApp



Telegram



LINE



WeChat



Signal

MEDIA AND NEWS HABITS

MEDIA AND NEWS HABITS

With increased usage of WeChat and other Chinese-language media outlets in Australia, we surveyed Chinese-Australians about their media habits and perceived bias in the Australian media.

KEY FINDING

50%

SAY THAT AUSTRALIAN MEDIA REPORTING ABOUT CHINA IS TOO NEGATIVE

Chinese-Australians report a high level of engagement with both Australian and Chinese politics and government. The vast majority of Chinese-Australians (86%) say they follow news about Australian politics and government either sometimes or often. Three-quarters (76%) say they follow news about Chinese politics and government sometimes or often, although few report following Chinese news often (19%), with a minor preference for Australian news (32%). Respondents who arrived in Australia between 2010 and 2019 follow Australian and Chinese news and politics equally frequently (86% sometimes or often). Chinese-language media based in China, such as *Xinhua*, *People’s Daily* and *CGTN*, remain an important source of news and information, with 74% of Chinese-Australians accessing such a source ‘sometimes’ or ‘often’.

For Chinese-Australians, the most frequently accessed source of both English and Chinese-language news is social media, followed by online newspapers and other online sources including blogs. Almost half the Chinese-Australian community (46%) turn to social media ‘often’ for English-language news, and 34% use online newspapers. A much smaller proportion of Chinese-Australians rely on traditional media sources, such as free-to-air TV (25% saying ‘often’), radio (22%) and print newspapers (17%). A similar hierarchy exists in accessing Chinese-language news, with 44% using social media ‘often’ and 36% looking to online sources including blogs. Only 17% use Chinese-language free-to-air television and radio often, which may reflect the limited availability of Chinese-language services in Australia. Similarly, only 16% report reading Chinese-language print newspapers often.

WeChat, China’s most popular social media app, is an important source of both English and Chinese-language news for Chinese-Australians. Eight in ten Chinese-Australians (84%) use WeChat often or sometimes for Chinese-language news, and 64% of respondents use WeChat often or sometimes for English-language news. The saturation of WeChat usage amongst recent migrants is particularly noticeable: 92% of Chinese-Australians migrating to Australia between 2010 and 2019 use WeChat often or sometimes to read Chinese-language news.


This high level of reliance on WeChat for news (both in Chinese and English) may affect respondents’ perception of political events in Australia, as WeChat routinely censors content, even outside China.³³

In 2020, WeChat censored a message from Prime Minister Scott Morrison to the Chinese-Australian community.³⁴

Perceptions of bias in Australian media reporting about China may be favouring WeChat as a source of news for Chinese-Australians. Half of the Chinese-Australian population (50%) say Australian media reporting about China is 'too negative'. Fewer than one in three (31%) say it is 'fair and balanced'. In contrast, the parallel survey of the broader population found that only 26% say Australian media reporting of China is too negative, with 61% saying it is fair and balanced. However, almost one in five (19%) of Chinese-Australians take the opposing view, saying that Australian media reporting about China is 'too positive'.


For Chinese Australians, the most frequently accessed source of both English-language and Chinese-language news is social media.

For each of the following, please indicate if you use this source often, sometimes or never to get your English/Chinese-language news?




WeChat, China's most popular social media app, is an important source of both English-language and Chinese-language news for Chinese-Australians.

Now thinking about WeChat in particular. Please indicate if you use WeChat often, sometimes or never to get your English/Chinese-language news?




Most Chinese-Australians follow news about both Australian and Chinese politics and government.

How often do you follow news about Australian/Chinese politics and government?




Three-quarters of Chinese-Australians use Chinese-language media based in China, such as Xinhua and the *People's Daily*.

Thinking specifically about Chinese-language media based in China, such as Xinhua, CGTN, *Global Times*, *People's Daily* and China Radio International, how often do you access news and information from Chinese-language media based in China?



Half the Chinese-Australian community say that Australian media reporting about China is too negative.

Overall, would you say Australian media reporting about China is too positive, too negative or fair and balanced?



Too negative Fair and balanced Too positive Don't know

Data for the broader Australian population was gathered during a parallel survey and fielded to a nationally representative sample of more than 3000 Australian adults in November 2020.



IMMIGRATION

IMMIGRATION

While immigration has slowed to a halt in 2020, we compared views of Chinese-Australians about Australia’s migrant intake to those of the broader Australian population.

KEY FINDING

47%

BELIEVE THE NUMBER OF MIGRANTS COMING TO AUSTRALIA EACH YEAR IS ABOUT RIGHT


The majority of Chinese-Australians are supportive of the rate of immigration into Australia, particularly when compared with the broader Australian population. Almost half the Chinese-Australian population (47%) say that the total number of migrants coming to Australia each year is about right, and 24% say it is too low. Less than a third (29%) say the number of migrants is too high. By contrast, many more Australians (47%) said the number of migrants coming to Australia was too high in the 2019 Lowy Institute Poll.³⁵

When asked about potential benefits and disadvantages of immigration, Australians responding to the Lowy Institute Poll have expressed generally positive views in the past, but Chinese-Australians are even more positive about immigration. Three-quarters of Chinese-Australians agree that ‘immigrants strengthen the country because of their hard work and talents’ (75%, compared with 65% of all Australians in 2019). A similar number of Chinese-Australians say that ‘immigration has a positive impact on the economy of Australia’ (74% versus 67% all Australians). A similar gap exists for those that say ‘accepting immigrants from many different countries makes Australia stronger’, a view held by 73% of Chinese-Australians and 62% of the national population.

While 71% of all Australians in 2019 said that ‘Australian cities are already too crowded’, only 50% of Chinese-Australians agree. And while 47% of all Australians said ‘immigrants are a burden on our social welfare system’ in 2019, fewer Chinese-Australians (38%) take that view. Around a third of Chinese-Australians (37%) say that ‘immigrants take away jobs from other Australians’, similar to the broader population (40%).

Chinese-Australians express more support for Australia's migrant intake than the broader Australian population.


Now thinking about Australia's immigration program, do you personally think that the total number of migrants coming to Australia each year is too low, too high or about right?



Data for the broader Australian population is from the [2019 Lowy Institute Poll](#).

Most Chinese-Australians see immigration as a strength, and a benefit to Australia's economy.

Please indicate whether you personally agree or disagree with each of the following statements about immigration:



■ Agree
 ■ Disagree
 ■ Don't know

Data for the broader Australian population is from the [2019 Lowy Institute Poll](#).

CONCLUSION

The results of the first Lowy Institute poll of Chinese-Australians show a broad diversity of experiences and perspectives across Chinese-Australian communities. Compared with the broader Australian population, there is both continuity and divergence. Most Chinese-Australians are proud of life in Australia, and express belonging to their adopted country and local community. Many are also positive about China, and feel that they belong to the Chinese people as well. A sizeable minority report having experienced discrimination of some kind. Adding these already diverse perspectives, there is a mix of views on foreign interference, media reporting and systems of government. Although Chinese leaders have renewed calls for “uniting the vast number of overseas Chinese to realise the Chinese dream”,³⁶ this survey shows there is little uniformity amongst Chinese-Australian communities. Rather, the views of Chinese-Australians vary depending on waves of migration, personal identity, political leaning and a range of other factors.

METHODOLOGY

Being Chinese in Australia: Public Opinion in Chinese Communities reports the results of a national survey of 1040 adults in Australia who self-identify as of Chinese heritage, conducted between 10 and 30 November 2020 in English, Mandarin (Traditional) and Mandarin (Simplified). The survey was conducted by the Social Research Centre (SRC) using the Life in Australia™ panel — currently the only probability-based online panel in Australia — and via a non-probability panel (Multicultural Marketing and Management). The order of questions in the questionnaire was different from the order presented in this report.

Chinese-Australians constitute a population that is dispersed and diverse, including recent immigrants from multiple countries with different native languages who may have difficulty completing a public opinion survey in English. Increased attention paid to Chinese-Australians by both the Australian and Chinese political class may have also made some more reluctant to cooperate with a survey request.³⁷ Collectively, these characteristics present significant challenges to anyone wishing to survey this population.

Given approximately 5.6% of the Australian population identify as of Chinese ancestry in the census, randomly recruiting a sample of 1000 Chinese-Australians would have required interviewing and screening approximately 20 000 Australians. This approach would not have been practical, and so the SRC combined probability and non-probability responses to build a representative sample. The qualities of a probability-based survey ensure better coverage of the general population, including panellists who cannot complete surveys online, and are thus more accurate than non-probability panels. However, the number of panellists that identified as being of Chinese heritage, and therefore qualified for the Life in Australia™ survey was 173. Thus, to obtain a sample size sufficient for the analysis of subgroups, inclusion of a nonprobability sample was necessary.

Of the 1040 respondents, 96 responses (completion rate of 55.5%) were achieved via the Life in Australia™ probability-based panel. One hundred and seventy-three members were invited to complete the survey. Members of the panel were randomly recruited via their landline or mobile telephone (rather than being self-selected volunteers). The methodology adopted was a mixed-mode approach, including both online and telephone surveys. The survey was offered to the Life in

Australia™ panel in English only, and conducted from 10 to 23 November 2020.

The remaining 944 responses were obtained from the non-probability Multicultural Research Panel, operated by Multicultural Marketing and Management. Recruitment was conducted by advertising on social media platforms and through the organisation's network. A total of 1152 engaged with the survey, with 944 responses (completion rate of 81.9%). The survey was conducted from 11 to 30 November 2020. Completion rates across the language options were 15.1% in English, 73.2% in Mandarin (Simplified) and 11.7% in Mandarin (Traditional). An IP address trigger was included, and this excluded 25 (2.2%) of panel members who were identified as not responding from inside Australia.

The non-probability sample obtained was over-represented in several categories. Compared to the demographic benchmarks from the 2016 census and from Life in Australia™, respondents had higher levels of education, were younger and less likely to be citizens. Inclusion of the Life in Australia™ responses did reduce the bias, but the over-representation of the abovementioned three categories remained. To address the bias, a super-population model for weighting was used. This methodology uses a statistical model to describe the target population and produce sample weights, rather than using selection probabilities. The choice of variables to be included in the model was driven by the availability of population benchmarks and the statistical accuracy achieved. Various combinations of variables were tested to align the combined sample as closely as possible to the target population. The final weighting solution selected includes age, citizenship, education, and parents' country of birth. Given the limitations, the combined panel approach reduced the bias associated with the non-probability sample and improved the accuracy of the findings, resulting in an overall weighting efficiency of 48.5% and a margin of error of 1.96%.

The parallel national survey was conducted on 3029 adults between 9 and 23 November by the SRC. The survey was conducted by the SRC, using the Life in Australia™ panel — currently the only probability-based online panel in Australia. Members of the panel were randomly recruited via their landline or mobile telephone (rather than being self-selected volunteers) and agreed to provide their contact details to take part in surveys on a regular basis. SRC uses a mixed-mode approach for the panel, including online surveys (89% of respondents) and computer-assisted telephone interviewing (11% of respondents) to provide

coverage of the offline population (households without internet access).

TABLES

Table 1: Australia as a place to live

Overall, how would you rate Australia as a place to live?

Very good	45%
Good	32%
Total: Very good / good	77%
Average	20%
Poor	2%
Very poor	0%
Total: Poor / Very poor	2%

Table 2: Pride in Australian life and culture

To what extent do you take pride in the Australian way of life and culture?

To a great extent	45%
To a moderate extent	39%
Total: To a great extent / moderate extent	84%
Only slightly	13%
Not at all	2%
Total: Only slightly / not at all	15%
Don't know / refused	1%

BEING CHINESE IN AUSTRALIA: PUBLIC OPINION IN CHINESE COMMUNITIES

Table 3: Year of arrival

In what year did you first arrive in Australia to live here for one year or more?

1960–1969	1%
1970–1979	2%
1980–1989	4%
1990–1999	12%
2000–2009	35%
2010–2019	47%
2020–Now	0%

Table 4: Acceptance in Australian society

In your day-to-day life do you feel that you are generally accepted, or not accepted as part of Australian society?

Yes, I feel I am generally accepted as part of Australian society	69%
No, I do not feel I am generally accepted as part of Australian society	24%
Neither	7%

BEING CHINESE IN AUSTRALIA: PUBLIC OPINION IN CHINESE COMMUNITIES

Table 5: Perceptions of acceptance in Australian society

And, do you feel that Australians of Chinese heritage generally are, or are not accepted as part of Australian society?

Yes, Australians of Chinese heritage generally are accepted as part of Australian society	63%
No, they are not generally accepted as part of Australian society	36%
Don't know / refused	1%

Table 6: Self-identification

Overall, do you think yourself as...?

Chinese-Australian	44%
Chinese	34%
Australian-Chinese	11%
Australian	9%
None of the above	2%

Table 7: Sense of belonging

And to what extent do you have a sense of belonging to... (ranked by total indicating 'to a great extent' and 'to a moderate extent')

	To a great extent	To a moderate extent	Total: To a great extent / moderate	Only slightly	Not at all	Total: Only slightly / not at all
Australia	26%	45%	71%	26%	2%	28%
Your local community	23%	46%	69%	24%	6%	30%
Chinese people	29%	39%	68%	25%	8%	33%
China	23%	42%	65%	25%	10%	35%

BEING CHINESE IN AUSTRALIA: PUBLIC OPINION IN CHINESE COMMUNITIES

Table 8: Perceptions of discrimination

Just your impression, in Australia today, is there a lot of discrimination against people of Chinese heritage, or not?

	Chinese-Australians	Australian population
Yes, there is	26%	36%
No, not a lot	72%	61%
Don't know / refused	3%	3%

Table 9: Personal experience of discrimination

For each of the following, please indicate if you have, or have not, personally experienced it in the last 12 months in Australia?

	People have treated you differently or less favourably because you are of Chinese heritage	Someone expressed support for you because you are of Chinese heritage	You have been called offensive names because you are of Chinese heritage	You have been physically threatened or attacked because you are of Chinese heritage
Yes, has happened to me in the last 12 months	37%	40%	31%	18%
No, has not happened to me in the last 12 months	63%	60%	69%	82%

BEING CHINESE IN AUSTRALIA: PUBLIC OPINION IN CHINESE COMMUNITIES

Table 10: Causes of discrimination*

Would you say the following factors did or did not cause or contribute to that experience?*

	COVID-19	Australia–China relations	Other factors
Yes, did contribute	66%	52%	13%
No, did not contribute	34%	48%	86%
Don't know / refused	0%	0%	1%

*n=717 for Tables 10 and 11, as respondents answered 'Yes' to the previous question and were then asked about causes or factors.

Table 11: Other causes of discrimination — self entered*

Racism	28%
Language	11%
China–Australia relations	6%
Hong Kong / Taiwan	5%
Media	5%
Lack of knowledge	4%
Politics	4%
COVID-19	3%
Culture	2%
Historical reasons	2%
Immigration	-
Other	8%
Don't know / refused	23%

*n=717 for Tables 10 and 11, as respondents answered 'Yes' to the previous question and were then asked about causes or factors.

BEING CHINESE IN AUSTRALIA: PUBLIC OPINION IN CHINESE COMMUNITIES

Table 12: Attention to foreign interference

Do you personally think too much, too little or about the right amount of attention is given to the issue of foreign interference by each of the following groups?

	Too much attention	Too little attention	About the right amount
Media	45%	28%	27%
Politicians	44%	30%	26%
Public	30%	39%	31%

Table 13: Foreign influence in Australian political processes (Chinese-Australians)

Are you personally concerned or not concerned about the influence of each of the following countries on Australia’s political processes?

	No, not concerned	Yes, concerned
US	67%	33%
China	54%	46%
India	46%	54%
Japan	45%	55%

Table 14: Foreign influence in Australian political processes (Australian population)

Are you personally concerned or not concerned about the influence of each of the following countries on Australia’s political processes?

	No, not concerned	Yes, concerned
US	39%	61%
China	18%	82%

BEING CHINESE IN AUSTRALIA: PUBLIC OPINION IN CHINESE COMMUNITIES

Table 15: Contact with Chinese embassy or consulate

Over the last 12 months, how often, if at all, have you had any contact with the Chinese embassy or consulate in your state or territory?

Regularly	2%
Occasionally	14%
Total: Regularly / Occasionally	16%
Once or twice	39%
Not at all	45%

Table 16: Interaction with overseas Chinese organisations

Over the last 12 months, how often, if at all, have you had any interaction with overseas Chinese community and cultural organisations?

At least once a week	7%
About once a month	18%
Total: At least once a week/about once a month	25%
Every few months	26%
Once or twice	21%
Total: Every few months / once or twice	47%
Never	28%

BEING CHINESE IN AUSTRALIA: PUBLIC OPINION IN CHINESE COMMUNITIES

Table 17: Trust in major powers

How much do you trust the following countries to act responsibly in the world? (ranked by total who trust ‘a great deal’ and ‘somewhat’)

	A great deal	Somewhat	Total: a great deal and somewhat	Not very much	Not at all	Total: not very much and not at all
Australia	27%	47%	74%	23%	2%	25%
China	22%	50%	72%	21%	7%	28%
US	13%	44%	57%	34%	9%	43%
Japan	14%	40%	54%	39%	7%	46%
India	8%	33%	41%	43%	16%	59%

Table 18: Economic partner or security threat

In your own view, is the following country more of an economic partner to Australia or more of a security threat to Australia?

	More of an economic partner to Australia	More of a security threat to Australia
China	66%	34%
Japan	66%	34%
India	60%	40%
US	59%	41%

BEING CHINESE IN AUSTRALIA: PUBLIC OPINION IN CHINESE COMMUNITIES

Table 19: Threats to vital interests

Here is a list of possible threats to the vital interests of Australia in the next ten years. For each one, please select whether you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all (ranked by % saying ‘a critical threat’).

	Critical threat	An important but not critical threat	Total: critical and important threat	Not an important threat at all
COVID-19 and other potential epidemics	51%	39%	90%	10%
A severe downturn in the global economy	41%	49%	90%	10%
The dissemination of false information and fake news	40%	46%	86%	14%
Cyberattacks from foreign countries	36%	48%	84%	17%
The rise of authoritarian systems of government around the world	34%	49%	83%	17%
A military conflict between US and China over Taiwan	32%	49%	81%	19%
Large numbers of immigrants and refugees coming into Australia	32%	52%	84%	17%
Climate change	30%	56%	86%	14%
Foreign interference in Australian politics	29%	59%	88%	12%

BEING CHINESE IN AUSTRALIA: PUBLIC OPINION IN CHINESE COMMUNITIES

Table 20: Views on democracy (Chinese-Australians)

Please say which one of the three statements comes closest to your own personal views about democracy.

Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government	36%
In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable	41%
For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have	22%
Don't know / refused	1%

Table 21: Views on democracy (Australian population)

Please say which one of the three statements comes closest to your own personal views about democracy.

Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government	71%
In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable	16%
For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have	12%
Don't know / refused	1%

Table 22: China's system of government

Thinking about the way China has handled the COVID-19 outbreak, are you more or less favourable towards China's system of government?

More favourable	43%
Less favourable	31%
About the same	25%

BEING CHINESE IN AUSTRALIA: PUBLIC OPINION IN CHINESE COMMUNITIES

Table 23: Australian government policies towards China

Would you support or oppose the following Australian government policies towards China?

	Support	Oppose
Jointly funding aid projects with China in the Pacific and Asia	70%	30%
Imposing travel and financial sanctions on Chinese officials associated with human rights abuses	67%	33%
Allowing Chinese companies to supply technology for critical infrastructure in Australia	65%	35%
Working to find other markets for Australia to reduce our economic dependence on China	65%	35%
Conducting joint military exercises with China and other countries	58%	42%
Restricting joint scientific research between Australia and China in defence and security-related fields	49%	51%

Table 24: Sources of English-language news

For each of the following please indicate if you use this source often, sometimes or never to get your English-language news. (ranked by total indicating ‘often’ and ‘sometimes’)

	Often	Sometimes	Total: Often / sometimes	Never
Social media	46%	38%	84%	15%
Free-to-air TV	25%	55%	80%	19%
Radio	22%	55%	77%	23%
Online newspapers	34%	43%	77%	23%
Other online sources incl blogs	26%	49%	75%	25%
Printed newspapers	17%	50%	67%	33%
Pay TV	19%	32%	51%	49%

BEING CHINESE IN AUSTRALIA: PUBLIC OPINION IN CHINESE COMMUNITIES

Table 25: Sources of Chinese-language news

For each of the following please indicate if you use this source often, sometimes or never to get your Chinese-language news. (ranked by total indicating ‘often’ and ‘sometimes’)

	Often	Sometimes	Total: Often / sometimes	Never
Social media	44%	40%	84%	17%
Other online sources incl blogs	36%	40%	76%	24%
Online newspapers	26%	49%	75%	25%
Free-to-air TV	17%	51%	68%	33%
Radio	17%	43%	60%	40%
Printed newspapers	16%	44%	60%	40%
Pay TV	17%	32%	50%	50%

Table 26: WeChat and English-language news

And now thinking about WeChat in particular. Please indicate if you use WeChat often, sometimes or never to get your English-language news.

Often	13%
Sometimes	51%
Total: Often / sometimes	64%
Never	36%
Don't know / refused	1%

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Table 27: WeChat and Chinese-language news

And please indicate if you use WeChat often, sometimes or never to get your Chinese-language news.

Often	34%
Sometimes	50%
Total: Often / sometimes	84%
Never	16%
Don't know / refused	1%

Table 28: Australian politics and government

How often do you follow news about Australian politics and government?

Often	32%
Sometimes	54%
Total: Often / sometimes	86%
Never	13%

Table 29: Chinese politics and government

How often do you follow news about Chinese politics and government?

Often	19%
Sometimes	57%
Total: Often / sometimes	76%
Never	23%

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Table 30: Chinese-language media in China

How often do you access news and information from Chinese-language media based in China?

Often	22%
Sometimes	52%
Total: Often / sometimes	74%
Never	26%

Table 31: Australian media reporting about China

Overall, would you say Australian media reporting about China is:

	Chinese-Australians	Australian population
Too negative	50%	26%
Too positive	19%	10%
Fair and balanced	31%	61%
Don't know	0%	3%

Table 32: Immigration to Australia

Do you personally think that the total number of migrants coming to Australia each year is...?

Too high	29%
Too low	24%
About right	47%

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Table 33: Attitudes to immigration

Please indicate whether you personally agree or disagree with each of the following statements about immigration:

	Agree	Disagree	Don't know / refused
Immigrants strengthen the country because of their hard work and talents	75%	24%	1%
Overall, immigration has a positive impact on the economy of Australia	74%	26%	0%
Accepting immigrants from many different countries makes Australia stronger	73%	27%	0%
Australian cities are already too crowded	50%	50%	0%
Immigrants are a burden on our social welfare system	38%	61%	1%
Immigrants take away jobs from other Australians	37%	63%	1%

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